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system and their tight connection to sugar production are impres-
sive. Clearly, local studies have much to contribute to a fuller under-
standing of this subject.
Jules R. Benjamin
Ithaca College
doi:10.1093/es/khj016
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To anyone teaching the political economy of protection, Chile must
be among the closest “natural” experiments around. This book pro-
vides a rich and very informative interpretation of Chilean trade pol-
icies that covers the period 1810–2000.
Chapter 1 reviews the contributions by economists and political
scientists to the public choice approach to the determinants of
protection. Contributions by the economics and political science
literature are grafted to a supply-demand framework of protection,
with much of the discussion focusing on the contributions to the
structure and level of protection, treated separately. The dis-
cussion is kept at the right level of generality for an interdiscipli-
nary approach, and the review is quite exhaustive in coverage. In
terms of the Chilean experience, the most important insight of this
theoretical overview is that macroeconomic considerations lead to
“policy cycles.” Thus, as emphasized by Bates, Krueger, Rodrik,
and others, trade policy and other reforms that lead to strong
redistributive effects are only likely to be carried out during
periods of crisis when the efficiency of reforms looms large rela-
tive to the (politically) costly redistribution that accompanies
these reforms.
Chapter 2 looks for evidence of trade policy cycles, whose exist-
ence was first put forth in the context of U.S. trade policies by Judith
Goldstein. The objective is to see whether there is any link between
the outcome openness measure (filtered and corrected for terms-of-
trade variations) and the constructed dichotomous indices of trade
policy changes. The detailed description of trade policy measures
reveals that tariffs were first put in place to raise government revenue
in the late nineteenth century, then again in 1914 prior to the rise in
nitrate and copper prices during the war. Thus, over a two-century
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1467222700003888
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:31:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
188 ENTERPRISE & SOCIETY
episode, the trade share in gross domestic product peaked in the
period 1890–1930, before the onslaught of the Great Depression, and
only recovered to its previous peak at the very end of the twentieth
century.
Chapter 3 applies econometric methods to disentangle the cor-
relates of trade policy changes. First, tests of structural breaks are
carried out on the constructed openness series, yielding breaks in
1918 or 1930 depending on the method. This result is not parti-
cularly credible as an indicator of changes in trade policy since, in
spite of the possibility of detecting several structural breaks, the
tests fail to show a break for the post-1973 period. More interesting
are the results of probit regressions that seek to explain the pro-
bability of changes in trade policy (as measured by a dichotomous
indicator constructed from the detailed description of trade policy
changes) in terms of the political economy elements identified in
chapter 1. The results give overall support to the macro view of
the political economy of protection because it is the macro crises
and fiscal indicator variables that are most consistently good
predictors.
Chapter 4 draws on jointly published work dealing with the
remarkable period of trade liberalization under the military regime.
The author emphasizes the role of ideas (the cohesion among the
“Chicago boys”) and the compensatory policies that accompanied
the reforms. While the coverage of influential ideas and accompany-
ing policies is good, I wanted more discussion of the difficulties
associated with some of the reforms, notably of the banking sector, of
the high unemployment before the period of real exchange apprecia-
tion, which was largely brought about by a misguided stabilization
policy, of the debate about the large capital inflows under disequilib-
rium real interest rates in a liberalized financial sector, and of distri-
butional shifts caused by prudential failures in the banking sector,
details that were covered in writings at the time (such as V. Corbo,
J. de Melo, and J. Tybout, “What Went Wrong with the Recent
Reforms in the Southern Cone,” Economic Development and Cul-
tural Change 34, no. 2 [1986]: 561–87).
Similarly, the chapter is brief on the political economy of support
for unilateral trade liberalization under democratically elected gov-
ernments in the 1990s. Lederman rightly points out that compensa-
tion via real exchange rate depreciation was a key ingredient and that
the success of earlier policy reforms was important. He also is right
in emphasizing the soundness of the economic team under the
Aylwin government, which successfully implemented targeted social
expenditures by raising government revenues. Yet, granting that
compensatory policies were important, as documented by the author,
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were there not other intervening factors? Were proliberalization
lobbies powerful at that juncture? Was the timing of “cycles” in cop-
per prices important for government social policies?
Anyone interested in the political economy of trade policy will
find in Lederman’s book a detailed and careful study of Chile’s fasci-
nating succession of trade policy episodes. The interpretation is
nicely related to the major explanations offered by economists and
political scientists, and a valiant effort is made at disentangling com-
peting explanations.
Jaime de Melo
University of Geneva
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Julie Hessler’s work is the first comprehensive history of the first
thirty-five years of Soviet trade written after the opening of the
Soviet Union’s archives following that nation’s collapse. It will,
without doubt, become a standard work of reference. Hessler gives
due credit to the Soviet historian G. A. Dikhtiar’s three-volume work
on Russian and Soviet trade published in the 1960s (in Russian).
Despite the book’s obvious ideological overtones, it deserves to be
read alongside Hessler’s work. Hessler’s study is particularly inter-
esting since it is not only a detailed history of the distribution of
goods, but it also presents an interesting interpretation of the wider
workings of the Soviet economic system. As Hessler agues, Soviet
economic policy was caught up in a vicious circle that reproduced
its own crises. Its main problem was how to regulate the exchange
between the town and the country.
The Soviet organization of trade consisted of four institutional
arrangements: private shops, bazaars and markets, cooperatives, and
state shops. In the absence of a comprehensive network of state
shops, cooperatives, with prerevolutionary origins, became a corner-
stone of trade during the revolutionary period. Under the new imper-
atives of bureaucratic state regulation, they increased their share in
trade. According to the official doctrine, cooperatives were to cater to
the rural consumers, whereas state shops would take care of the
urban market. More luxurious state shops and department stores
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